Human Capital and Regional Wage Gaps by López-Bazo, Enrique & Motellón Corral, Elisabet
 
 
 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2009                                               Working Papers 2009/24, 29 pages
1
 
 
Human Capital and Regional Wage Gaps. 
 
Enrique López-Bazo 
Elisabet Motellón 
 
 
 AQR—IREA, Universitat de Barcelona, Avda Diagonal 690 
Tel:  +34 93 4037041 FAX: +34 93 4021821  
Email: elopez@ub.edu  
 
 Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Av. Tibidabo 39-43 
Tel:  + 34 932537501    FAX: +34 934176495    
Email: emotellon@uoc.edu       
 & 
AQR—IREA, Universitat de Barcelona 
Tel:  + 34 93 4021010   FAX: +34 93 4021821   
Email:  emotellon@ub.edu   
 
Abstract: This paper uses micro-level data to 
analyse the effect of human capital on regional 
wage differentials. The results for the set of 
Spanish regions confirm that they differ in the 
endowment of human capital, but also that the 
return that individuals obtain from it varies sharply 
across regions. Regional heterogeneity in returns is 
especially intense in the case of education, 
particularly when considering its effect on the 
employability of individuals. These differences in 
endowment and, especially, in returns to human 
capital, account for a significant proportion of 
regional wage gaps. 
 
 
Keywords: Education, Experience, Regional 
disparities, Returns to human capital, Wage gap 
decomposition 
 
JEL: C24, J31, R11, R23 
 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
The effect of human capital – an intangible asset embodied in individuals – on regional 
growth and development has been examined by regional scientists and economists in recent 
decades. The assumption has been that the human capital endowment of a regional economy 
is an essential element in explaining its level of development and long-run economic growth. 
Besides its effect as an additional factor of production, it has been argued that human capital 
allows and encourages the generation and adoption of technological innovations that improve  
productivity. Almost all the studies to date have used aggregate data for a set of regions, and 
so the key variables considered have been the average of the measure used to proxy for the 
endowment of human capital (e.g. average years of schooling or the share of population with 
a certain educational attainment) in each region and some measure of aggregate economic 
activity, such as income or output per capita. In addition, previous studies have only 
considered the possibility that regional differences in levels of development and growth are 
due to different human capital endowments across regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufí, 
2005; Di Liberto, 2008; López-Bazo and Moreno, 2008; Bronzini and Piselli, 2009). That is, 
no attention has been paid to the possibility that regional heterogeneity in the effect of human 
capital may be the cause of some of the economic disparities observed across regions. This 
paper argues that regions may differ in both the endowment and the return to human capital 
accumulated by individuals. Accordingly, both should be considered when explaining 
regional differences in levels of economic activity. 
 
To complement the evidence obtained by using aggregate data, this paper proposes the use of 
micro-data at the regional level. Micro-data provide additional evidence on the effect of 
human capital in explaining regional disparities and, in turn, a more appropriate control of 
regional differences in the distribution of individuals’ characteristics. In particular, the use of 
individual data makes it possible to quantify the degree of regional differences in human 
capital endowment and also to measure its specific effect in each region, that is, to check 
whether the regions are also heterogeneous in the returns they obtain from human capital 
investments made by individuals. This has obvious implications for assessing policies 
designed to increase human capital endowment in order to promote growth in the less 
developed regions, as the effectiveness of such policies largely depends on the particular 
effect that human capital has in each region. 
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The use of information at the individual level allows a consideration of two different effects 
of human capital on regional economic performance. The first is the immediate effect on 
productivity from those in employment. The second is an indirect effect that is likely to occur 
through the increased employability of individuals endowed with a certain level of human 
capital. Studies using aggregate regional data have focused only on the first of these effects, 
although there is evidence to support a positive effect of human capital on labour market 
participation and a negative influence on the likelihood and duration of episodes of 
unemployment. Our hypothesis is that the two types of effect may differ across regions, thus 
contributing to regional disparities. 
 
Using reliable individual data on wages obtained from a representative survey for each 
Spanish region, this paper assesses the effect of human capital within the framework of a 
Mincerian wage equation. Under the human capital theory, the higher a worker’s human 
capital endowment, the higher the wage she will earn, since it is assumed that education and 
experience (the two traditional components of individuals’ human capital) have a positive 
effect on her productivity.1 Within this context, we analyse the contribution of human capital 
to regional wage gaps, the hypotheses being that i) in addition to the effect associated with 
regional differences in human capital endowment, heterogeneity in terms of its return across 
regions may play a key role in explaining regional wage gaps, and ii) there is a direct effect of 
human capital, since it affects productivity of employees, and an indirect effect, by increasing 
the employability of all individuals. Aggregating over the individuals in a given region, this 
means that human capital stimulates aggregate productivity and the employment rate, thus 
contributing to increasing regional income per capita. 
 
From a methodological point of view, the paper provides a framework for assessing regional 
differences in the conditional (being in employment) and the unconditional returns to 
education and experience. In a second step, it proposes a detailed decomposition of regional 
wage gaps to isolate the particular contribution of individuals’ human capital. The approach 
followed here has been common practice for decomposing wage gaps across different groups 
of workers (e.g. gender or racial gap) in the labour market literature. But its application to the 
                                                 
1 An alternative is to estimate the effect of human capital on firms’ productivity. However, the lack of 
firm-level data from a representative survey for each Spanish region prevented us from considering 
this approach. In any case, under well-known assumptions, the marginal productivity explanation of 
wage determination establishes the link between wages and productivity. The assessment of the return 
to human capital based on the estimation of a wage equation is standard in the labour market literature. 
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analysis of wage differentials across regions has been limited so far, and constrained to 
models that do not control for individuals’ decision to participate in the labour market (Reilly, 
1991; García and Molina, 2002). The results for the set of Spanish regions confirm 
differences in terms of human capital endowment, and also in the return that individuals 
obtain in each region. Regional heterogeneity in returns is especially intense in the case of 
education, particularly when they incorporate the indirect effect. The decomposition of the 
wage gap between each region and the rest of the country shows that these differences in the 
endowment and in the returns to human capital account for a significant portion of the gap. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the dataset and 
discusses the results of the descriptive analysis. The empirical wage model and the derivation 
of the returns to the components of human capital are sketched in Section 3, which also 
discusses the results obtained for the set of Spanish regions. Section 4 presents the method 
proposed to obtain the detailed decomposition of the regional wage gaps and discusses the 
results of the contribution of human capital. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. DATASET AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This paper uses the micro-data from the Spanish sample of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP).2 The ECHP is a standardized survey conducted in the Member 
States of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities (EUROSTAT). The survey involved annual interviewing of a representative 
panel of households and individuals in each country. The analysis in this paper exploits the 
2000 extended sample of the ECPH because it was specifically designed for cross-sectional 
studies and above all because it is the only wave that provides representative samples at the 
NUTS II regional level in Spain.  NUTS is the French acronym for Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics, a hierarchical classification established by EUROSTAT which 
provides comparable regional breakdowns of EU Member States. In Spain, the NUTS II 
                                                 
2 The ECHP has frequently been used in wage studies for the Spanish labour market and for other EU 
Member States (Montuenga et al, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufí, 2005; García-Pérez and 
Jimeno, 2007). Although the Earnings Structure Survey (a dataset also produced in the EU countries 
under the auspices of EUROSTAT) contains the most complete information on wages workers, jobs 
and firms’ characteristics, it does not provide information on the non-employed. This prevents us from 
controlling for sample selection and computing the indirect effects of human capital on wages through 
its effect on the probability of employment, which is one of the objectives of this paper.  
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regions correspond to the 17 Autonomous Communities, which are historical geographical 
and administrative regions with a high level of political and financial autonomy.3 The ECHP 
offers detailed information on the personal characteristics of the individuals, including the 
particularities of the household, as well as on the labour conditions of those employed. For the 
analysis of the effect of human capital on regional wages, the sample of individuals between 
16 and 65 years in all the Spanish regions, except for the two city-regions in the north of 
Africa (Ceuta and Melilla), has been selected.4 
 
A first insight into the amount of regional wage differentials in Spain is obtained from the 
simple description of the sample in Table 1, which shows the average gross hourly wage, its 
standard deviation and the number of workers contained in the sample for each one of the 
regions and for Spain as a whole. Large differences in average wages across regions are 
observed. For instance, the average wage in Extremadura, the region with the lowest wage 
level, was only 69.75% of the average wage in the Basque Country, the region with the 
highest. And the ratio between the top five regions and the five bottom regions is 1.29. This 
evidence confirms that the amount of regional wage disparities is of the same order of 
magnitude as those existing in other key economic variables such as income per capita and 
labour productivity. 
 
In order to control for the effect of price differentials, an estimate of the relative level of 
regional prices has been used to compute real wages in each region.5 The average and 
standard deviation of real wages are shown in the last two columns in Table 1. Taking account 
of price differentials causes some changes in the ranking of regions, the most significant case 
being Extremadura, which moves from bottom to eighth place. Additionally, wage 
differentials are somewhat lower in real terms. For instance, the average real wage in the five 
bottom regions increases by around 2% due to their lower relative prices, whereas the average 
                                                 
3 The regional representativeness of the sample for the entire panel of the ECHP is only guaranteed at 
the NUTS I level, which corresponds in Spain to an artificial grouping of regions based on 
geographical criteria alone. 
4 Individuals working less than 15 hours a day were removed from the sample, given that in this case 
the ECHP does not provide information on some variables that are important for our analysis (e.g. 
tenure). 
5 This information was kindly provided by the Catalan Institute for Statistics (IDESCAT), which 
estimates the parity power standards for the 17 Spanish regions from the aggregate Spanish figures 
used by the Statistical Office of the EU, EUROSTAT, to produce a data net of the cost of living 
differences across the Member States. Note that, given the common currency for the spatial units 
under analysis, parity power standards only account for differences in the cost of living.    
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in the five upper regions falls by the same percentage as a result of their higher prices. 
However, most of the regional disparities remain after controlling for differences in prices 
across regions: for instance, the average real wage in Murcia (the region with the lowest 
value) is still under 75% of the real wage in Madrid, the region with the highest level in real 
terms. 
 
Real wages may differ between regions because of what is known as the composition effect, 
that is to say, because workers’ characteristics differ across regions.6 In this case, the real 
wage paid to each class of workers should be interregionally invariant, and wage differentials 
would be merely an illusion caused by the failure to distinguish between types of labour 
(Farber and Newman, 1989). A simple look at the amount of regional differences in workers’ 
characteristics in the sample can be obtained from Table 2, which shows the average value for 
the characteristics observed in the sample for the whole of Spain, and for the two regions with 
the highest (Madrid) and lowest (Murcia) average real wage.7 In each case, the figures refer 
both to the sample of employees and non-employees (unemployed workers and non-
participants). Focusing on the measures of human capital, the results reveal notable 
differences in education (measured by years of schooling) and in tenure between the two 
regions. On average, employees in Madrid spent three years longer at school than those in 
Murcia; the difference is not so high among non-employees, but it remains non-negligible 
(more than 1.2 years). As regards tenure, most of the differences correspond to the categories 
of less than one year and more than 15 years. This is to do with regional differences in the 
number of fixed-term contracts; which is much higher in Murcia than in Madrid (for a further 
discussion of this issue, see Motellón, 2008). In contrast, there do not seem to be significant 
differences across regions in labour market experience. 
 
Table 2 shows differences between regions for other individual and household characteristics, 
such as gender, age and household composition, for both employees and non-employees. 
Therefore, wages may differ across regions because regions have different human capital 
endowments and because of other characteristics that are believed to affect wages directly and 
                                                 
6 It can be argued that jobs’ and firms’ characteristics also differ across regions. And as far as wages 
vary within these characteristics, the composition effect should include them as well. However, here 
the focus is on individuals’ characteristics, given our interest in the effect of human capital. In any 
case, a great deal of the wage variability associated with different jobs and firms is likely to be 
captured by differences in workers’ human capital if there is a process of sorting across jobs and firms 
depending on the endowment of human capital.    
7 Results for the 17 regions are not reported here to save space, though they are available upon request. 
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indirectly, through the probability of employment, but also because of regional differences in 
the return to human capital and in the price of other characteristics. 
 
This seems to be supported by the wage differences observed within categories of levels of 
schooling, tenure and experience, as reported in Table 3. This table shows the average real 
wage for the sample of workers in each of the categories of the human capital variables, for 
Spain as a whole and for the regions with the highest and lowest average real wages. Observe 
that the wage gap between Madrid and Murcia at each level of schooling decreases somewhat, 
although the average wage in Murcia was still some 20% lower. The only exception is the 
regional gap for workers with a university degree, in which case the average wage in Murcia 
was 92% of that in Madrid. The cases of tenure and experience are quite similar, as the 
regional gap within categories decreases only marginally (the wage in Murcia being between 
70% and 80% of that in Madrid for most of the categories). 
 
Taking this preliminary descriptive evidence into consideration, our hypothesis is that not 
only the endowments but also the returns to human capital vary across regions, thus 
contributing to wage differentials, both directly and indirectly through the impact that human 
capital has on the probability of employment. The next section presents results for the 
estimates of direct and indirect effects of human capital obtained when conditioned to other 
factors that are also likely to affect the wage earned by each worker. The estimates of the 
returns to schooling, tenure and experience obtained for each Spanish region will allow us to 
check for the regional heterogeneity in the returns to human capital.  
 
 
3. REGIONAL RETURNS TO HUMAN CAPITAL 
3.1. Empirical framework 
The framework for the empirical analysis is a model in which the wage for an individual i in 
region r is given by: 
 
 irririr XW   (1)
irrir
*
ir ZC   (2)
 
where Wir is the log of the wage of individual i in region r, Xir denotes the set of 
characteristics that affect the wage of this individual in a direct way (education, experience, 
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tenure, and gender), and r is the vector of prices or returns associated with the 
characteristics.8 *irC  is a latent and unobservable process that assigns the individual i in region 
r to the sample of employees or to the sample of non-employees, Zir being the vector of 
observations for characteristics that determine the process of selection (education, gender, 
age, marital status, chronic disease, proxies for household composition, and household 
income other than the wage of the individual)9 and r the corresponding parameters. ir y ir 
are i.i.d errors following a bivariate normal distribution  r ,	,	0,0, rr , with r the 
correlation coefficient for both error terms in region r. 
 
Only the result of the selection process in (2) is observed, the indicator variable Cir, that 
equals 1 when *irC >0, and 0 otherwise. Then, the probability of employment (selection) of 
individual i in region r is given by: 
 
     rirririr*irir Z
ZProb0CProbC   (3)
 
where 
(·) is the standard normal distribution function. 
 
Estimates of returns based on the wage equation in (1), leaving aside the selection equation in 
(2), are biased and inconsistent if r 0. Consistent estimates can be obtained by maximum 
likelihood considering the information from the two equations or, alternatively, by applying 
the two-step method proposed in Heckman (1976). The Heckit method includes the inverse 
Mills ratio in the wage equation as an additional regressor to obtain wages conditional on 
being employed: 
irirrrir
*
irir X0C|W   (4)
where  
)
(Z
)(Z
rir
rir
ir
	
  (5)
is the inverse Mills ratio for individual i in region r computed from the probabilistic model in 
(3), and 
rrr
	   is the coefficient that measures its effect on wages. 
                                                 
8 Note that, as is usual in this type of analysis, a simple specification of the Mincerian wage equation is 
used to obtain a better insight into the global effects of the human capital variables on wages (see 
Pereira and Silva, 2004). 
9 The full list of characteristics included in X and in Z is shown in Table 2. See section 3.2 for further 
details. 
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From the specification of the model of wage determination in (1) and (2), and the one for 
conditional wages in (4), different types of returns to characteristics can be defined.10 In the 
case of education – S – the conditional return is defined as: 
 

  iSrrSrir*iririr S0C|WECRS   (6)
 
where 
  irrrir*irir X0C|WE   and   irZ irriri  . Then, CRSir is the marginal 
effect of Sir on the conditional expected value of Wir. The second term is the correction that 
takes into account that only the effect of Sir on Wir for employed individuals should be 
considered. That is to say, CRSir is a measure of the effect that a year of education has on the 
wage received by employees. Notice that the conditional return to education will be different 
for each individual in each region, as it depends on the regional coefficients Sr , r, and r, and 
on the value of i. As is usual in these cases, the conditional return to education for each 
region r – CRSr – will be computed as the average for the sample of employees in that region. 
 
In addition, the expected value of the wage earned by a randomly selected individual from the 
entire population (employees and non-employees) is of interest as well: 
 

    
     2irrrirrir*irirririr r0.5	X·expZ
0C|w·EZ
wE   (7)
 
where wir is the wage level of individual i in region r. That is, for any individual the 
unconditional expected wage is the one obtained in the case of being employed, multiplied by 
the probability of being employed. The marginal effect of education on the unconditional 
expectation in (7) is then defined as the unconditional return to education (provided that the 
function is evaluated at a point with 
  0wE ir  ): 
 

  
  
 
i
S
riri
S
ri
S
rr
S
r
ir
ir
ir
irir
ir CRSS
wlnE
S
wEwE
URS 





  (8)
 
                                                 
10 See Greene (2003) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for the derivation of the expressions and the 
discussion of these marginal effects. Hoffmann and Kassouf (2005) and Arrazola and De Hevia (2008) 
used these expressions to compute different types of returns to education. 
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The second term in the unconditional return in (8) reflects the effect that education has on the 
probability of employment, which is an indirect effect on wages. As this effect is likely to be 
positive (more education will decrease the episodes of unemployment and non-participation), 
the URSir is expected to be higher than the CRSir. As stressed in Arrazola and De Hevia 
(2008) individuals take this indirect effect into account when they decide on their investment 
in education. As in the case of the conditional return, URSir depends on regional coefficients 
and on individual values for the characteristics that determine the process of participation, Zir. 
Accordingly, the unconditional return to education for each region r – URSr – will be 
computed as the average for the total sample of individuals (employees and non-employees) 
in that region. 
 
As for the other two components of human capital, experience and tenure, note that they are 
not included in the list of determinants of the probability of employment. As a consequence, 
they only exert a direct influence on wages through their inclusion in the wage equation. This 
means that the unconditional effects of these characteristics equal the conditional ones, which 
are simply a function of the corresponding elements in the vector of coefficients of the wage 
equation, .11 
   
3.2. Results 
The conditional and unconditional returns defined above were computed based on the 
estimation of the coefficients in the empirical wage model defined by (1) and (2). As already 
indicated, a simple specification for the wage equation was used to fully account for the 
effects of the human capital variables. It includes the number of years of schooling, the years 
of experience and its square, a set of dummies that account for tenure, and the gender of the 
individual. As for the participation equation in (2), in addition to the measure of education, it 
includes proxies for the individual and family characteristics that are supposed to affect the 
chance of being employed: the individual’s gender, age, and marital status, presence of 
chronic disease, the household income other than the wage earned by the individual, and 
variables of household composition such as its size, the number of children under 15 years, 
and the presence of children under 6 years. 
                                                 
11 As usual in the specification of wage equations, a quadratic form is used for experience (EXP·EXPir 
+EXP2·EXP2ir). As a result, the return to experience (conditional and unconditional) is 
EXP+2·EXP2·EXPir. In the case of tenure, its return will be measured by the estimation of the 
coefficients of each of its categories.  
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An instrumental variables estimator (IV) was used to avoid the bias of the traditional 
estimates due to the likely endogeneity of education. Suitable instruments should capture 
exogenous factors that affect the choice of the individuals’ degree of education but not their 
current wages. Immediate information on variables of this kind (such as family background 
and ability) is not readily available from surveys like the one used in this study. So we follow 
the suggestion made in the recent related literature and use as instruments variables that 
reflect whether the education of the individual was affected by profound changes in the 
educational system and by extraordinary historical events such as a war (see for instance 
Harmon and Walker, 1995; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 1999 and 2004; Arrazola et al, 2003). 
Specifically, a dummy variable was defined to account for the effect of the change in the 
regulation of the Spanish educational system brought in by the 1970 General Education Act, 
which established free, compulsory education for children between 6 and 14 years old. The 
instrument is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for individuals aged 6 or under in 
1971, that is, members of the sample whose period of schooling was affected by the reform. 
An instrument related to the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939) was also defined to capture its 
effects on individuals who were of school age during that period; in this case the 
corresponding dummy variable takes a value of 1 for individuals born in or before 1945. In 
addition, following the suggestion in Wooldridge (2002), the variables in Z, that is, the ones 
that affect the probability of employment, were included in the list of potential instruments for 
education in the wage equation.12 
 
IV estimates for the parameters of the wage system in (1) and (2) were obtained for each 
region and for Spain as a whole. They are not shown here for reasons of space, although some 
comments are in order. First, the coefficients in both equations were jointly significant in all 
cases, particularly for the human capital variables. For all the regions, education increases the 
wage earned and the probability of receiving a wage. Experience and tenure also exert a 
significant positive effect on wages. Second, the coefficient associated with the inverse Mills 
ratio, r, was statistically significant for 9 out of the 17 regions and for Spain as a whole. It 
was positive in all cases excepting two regions, in which it was not significant. This means 
that, in general, shocks that increase the probability of employment also increase the expected 
                                                 
12 Several statistics of the validity of instruments and the Sargan test of over-identification (to check 
for exogeneity of the set of instruments) were obtained for the IV estimation of each region and Spain 
as a whole.  The final set of instruments used in each case (which always includes the ones for the 
change in the educational system and the Civil War) was defined to fulfil both criteria. Details of these 
results are available upon request. 
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wage of employees. This shows that the expected wage of employed individuals is higher 
than that of individuals selected randomly from the entire population. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 reproduce the returns to the different types of human capital computed using 
the estimates above. As for the returns to education, the first and second columns of results in 
Table 4 show the conditional and unconditional returns. Remember that the conditional return 
for each region was computed with the sample of employees, whereas the unconditional one 
was calculated with the whole sample (employees, unemployed and non-participants). Both 
types of returns were statistically significant at 1% in Spain and in all regions (for this reason, 
asterisks are not included alongside the figures in Table 4). The conditional return to 
education in the entire country was above 6%, which means that an additional year of 
education increased the expected wage of those actually earning a wage by more than 6%. But 
this figure for the country as a whole hides significant regional heterogeneity in the 
conditional effect of education. The conditional return in Cantabria, the highest, almost 
doubled that in Madrid, the lowest. Among the regions with the highest conditional return are 
some of the traditionally less developed regions, such as Galicia, Murcia, Castile-León, 
Castile-La Mancha, and Extremadura. These are also among the regions with the lowest 
endowments of education. In contrast, the return was below the country average in the most 
advanced regions, which are the ones with the highest endowment of that type of human 
capital (such as Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia and the Basque Country). 
 
In view of the positive influence of education on the probability of employment and the 
positive sign of the estimate of r, the unconditional return to education in Spain as a whole 
was far above the conditional return. An increase of one year of schooling represented an 
increase of more than 16% in the expected wage of an individual randomly drawn from the 
Spanish active population. This result confirms the importance of considering the indirect 
effect of education when analysing its connection with wage expectations. Actually, the 
estimate for Spain suggests that the second term of the unconditional return defined in (8) –
the indirect effect — is far larger than the direct effect of education on employees’ 
productivity. The same argument applies to almost all the regions under analysis, although 
once again the results for the estimates of the unconditional returns at the regional level 
confirm our hypothesis of the strong spatial heterogeneity in the effect of education. The 
unconditional return in Navarre (12.4%) is half that in Extremadura, which is as high as 
24.5%. And regardless of some changes in the ranking, the association between returns and 
 13
the level of development (and in this case of employment rates) is also observed for 
unconditional returns. 
 
All in all, these estimates confirm the positive (direct and indirect) effect of education on 
wages and the existence of substantial regional variability in the return to investments in this 
type of human capital. In addition, the results in Table 5 show that there was also regional 
heterogeneity in the return to the other types of human capital considered in this study: 
general experience in the labour market and specific experience in the firm (tenure). In the 
country as a whole, an additional year of general experience caused an increase of around 1% 
in the expected wage. The return to experience is much higher in regions such as Extremadura 
and Galicia (1.76% and 1.63% respectively) and substantially below the country average in 
others like Baleares (0.68%) and Cantabria (0.78%). The case of returns to tenure is quite 
similar, as the profile of wage increases associated with the defined intervals of years of 
specific experience varies widely across regions. For instance, in the case of Madrid there was 
a substantial gain linked to workers’ tenure: employees with more than 15 years’ experience 
in the firm earned as much as 41% more than those with one or less than one year. This gain 
was far lower in Extremadura and Galicia (14% and 15% respectively. 
 
The evidence presented so far thus not only confirms that regions differed in the human 
capital endowment of their employees and the rest of their labour force but also shows 
sizeable regional variability in the return that individuals obtain from their accumulated 
human capital. As the final step in this study, the next section assesses the contribution of this 
variability in regional endowments and returns to the wage gap across regions. 
 
 
4. HUMAN CAPITAL AND REGIONAL WAGE GAPS 
4.1. Methodology 
This section briefly describes the method proposed to obtain a detailed decomposition of the 
average wage gap between any two regions (A and B), or between a region and the rest of the 
country, under the presence of a selection process such as the one described in (2). Technical 
details of the derivation are sketched in the appendix. From expression (4), the average of 
conditional wages in regions A and B can be expressed as: 
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AAAAA ˆˆXW   (9)
BBBBB ˆˆXW   (10)
 
where the “over bar” represents the value of the sample’s average. Defining the average of a 
counterfactual inverse Mills ratio for region B as: 
 
)ˆ
(
)ˆ(


   (11)
 
the difference between the second terms in the RHS of equations (9) and (10) can be 
expressed as: 
 
          B BAABAABABABBAA ˆˆˆˆˆˆ  (12)
 
Building on (12), Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) proposed an extension of the traditional 
decomposition as follows: 13 
 
          BBABABABABABAAABABA ˆˆˆˆˆXˆˆXXWW   (13)
 
The first two terms in the RHS of (13),    ABAAABA ˆˆXX  , correspond to 
differences in the endowment of characteristics between regions A and B, both those directly 
affecting wages and those determining the probability of employment. The third and fourth 
terms,    BABABAB ˆˆˆX  , measure the contribution to the wage gap of regional 
heterogeneity in returns, through the direct and the indirect effect respectively. Finally, 
  BBA ˆˆ   is a sort of residual term related to the regional difference in the impact of the 
process of selection on wages. 
 
The decomposition in (13) allows us to assess the contribution of characteristics and returns to 
the regional wage gap including the indirect effect coming from the process of selection. 
Therefore it is a decomposition of the gap in conditional wages. However, it does not allow us 
to obtain the contribution of each characteristic and each group of characteristics. This would 
be of particular interest when, as in this paper, we are interested in the effect of a set of 
                                                 
13 Notice that in what follows it is assumed that the no-discrimination wage structure is that in region 
A. 
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variables such as those proxying for workers’ human capital. The problem is how to assign 
the individual contribution to each variable when a non-linear term is involved; the actual and 
counterfactual inverse Mills ratios in equation (13). Our proposal to overcome this problem 
builds on Yun (2004)’s general decomposition of gaps in the first moments when the variable 
under analysis depends on a non-linear function which, however, has a linear function as 
argument. In this case, the decomposition in (13) can be expressed as: 
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are the weights that allow us to assign the contribution of each variable in X and Z to 
differences in characteristics ( i XP and
i
ZP ) and in returns (
iP  and 
iP  ).
14 lX and lZ denote 
the number of characteristics included in X and in Z respectively. 
 
4.2. Results 
Instead of decomposing the wage gap for each pair of the 17 Spanish NUTS II regions, we 
computed the global and the detailed decomposition for the gap between the rest of the 
country and each region r, that is  rrSP WW  , where rSPW   is the average (log) wage for the 
                                                 
14  Notice that i XP and 
iP  are the weight in the standard linear decomposition. 
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sample of employees in Spain excepting those in region r, and rW  is the corresponding 
average for region r.15 Then, following the notation in the previous section, A corresponds to 
SP-r, and B corresponds to r. To implement the decomposition of those gaps, we used the IV 
estimates of the coefficients in the wage and in the selection equation,  and , for each 
region, which were described in section 3.2. A set of IV estimates for the same coefficients 
was obtained corresponding to the samples of the rest of the country associated with each 
region. The characteristics of these estimates were similar to those discussed in section 3.2 in 
the case of the entire country.  
 
As a first step, the results obtained for the global decomposition in (13) are summarized in 
Table 6. The first column of results shows the regional wage gap as defined above. It is 
positive when the average wage in the rest of the country exceeds the average wage in the 
region, and negative when the wage is higher in the region. The second and third columns of 
results correspond to the contribution of differences in endowments and returns to all the 
characteristics. Finally, the last column contains the contribution of the residual component in 
the decomposition which depends on the difference between the coefficient  in the region 
and in the rest of the country: that is, the part of the wage gap attributed to differences in the 
particular impact of the probability of employment on the wage level. 
 
For most of the Spanish regions, the contribution of returns is almost as large as that of 
endowment. Actually, it is particularly intense in regions with a positive gap. In these cases 
the contribution of returns clearly exceeds that of endowment (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, 
La Rioja) or both are of the same order of magnitude (Castile-La Mancha, Valencia, Baleares, 
and Murcia). Interestingly, in Extremadura and in the Canaries, the contribution of returns 
was so favourable that it counterbalanced part of the contribution of the other elements 
(endowment and residual term). In other words, if the returns to all the characteristics in those 
regions had been similar to the ones in the rest of the country, their wage gap would have 
been even larger. In sharp contrast, differences in endowments seem to explain most of the 
gap for regions with wages above the rest of the country (i.e. the Basque Country, Navarre, 
Aragon, Madrid, and to a lesser extent Castile-Leon and Catalonia). Finally, it should be 
                                                 
15 It is impossible to summarize the results for the decomposition of the wage gap for all pairs of 
regions (17*16*0.5=136) in this type of publication. An alternative to the one in our study is to 
consider the gap with regard to a benchmark region (for instance, the one with the highest average 
wage), although this is subject to the criticism of the selection of the benchmark and slightly 
complicates the comparison of results across regions. 
 17
stressed that the contribution of the residual term in the decomposition in (13) is particularly 
intense for some regions, counterbalancing that associated with differences in returns in such 
cases (as in Asturias, La Rioja, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, and the Canaries). 
 
The specific contribution of human capital to the wage gap in each region is summarized in 
Table 7. The first column of results reproduces the magnitude and sign of the wage gap, as in 
the previous table, in order to aid interpretation of the results. The effects of differences in 
endowment and in returns to human capital are shown in the second and third columns of 
results respectively. It is clear that both endowment and returns to human capital account for 
most of the gap in regions with wages above those in the rest of the country (e.g. Madrid, 
Basque Country, Aragon). Actually, if they had been the only source of regional differences, 
the wage gap in favour of those regions would have been much wider. Interestingly, the effect 
of differences in returns is even larger than that of endowments. For instance, in the case of 
the region with the highest average wage, Madrid, the actual wage gap was -0.17. However, 
differences in human capital endowment and returns with the rest of the country would have 
provoked a much higher gap (-0.36). About two-thirds of the gap corresponds to differences 
in returns (-0.23). The actual gap was much lower because differences in other characteristics 
partially counterbalanced the effect of human capital. 
 
An interesting feature is observed for some regions with wages below those in the rest of the 
country. In Galicia, Castile-La Mancha, Andalusia, Murcia, and to a lesser extent in Baleares, 
the endowment of human capital contributed to the lower wages. But, in all cases, this effect 
was compensated by the contribution of returns. This was not so, however, for some other 
regions with low wages in which both effects worked in the same direction such as 
Extremadura, Valencia, and the Canaries. In any case, the results confirm that the contribution 
of differences in returns to human capital was greater than that of endowments for most of the 
regions. 
 
The next step in our analysis was to isolate the particular contribution of education to regional 
wage gaps. In the descriptive analysis and in the discussion of the estimated returns in section 
3.2, it was observed that regional heterogeneity was more intense in education than in the two 
types of workers’ experience. Correspondingly, we expected that most of the effect of human 
capital would come from the contribution of regional differences in education. The third and 
fourth columns of results in Table 7 show the contribution of endowments and returns to 
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education respectively. These figures confirm that most of the effects mentioned above in 
reference to human capital are related to education. As for the endowment, differences in 
education accounted for at least two-thirds of the effect of human capital in 12 out of the 17 
regions, and in two other regions the effect corresponding to education was above one-third of 
the global effect of human capital. In the case of returns, the effect attributable to education 
was at least two-thirds in all but two regions. Actually, the magnitude of the effect was higher 
for education than for the total contribution of human capital in 10 regions, meaning that 
differences in returns to experience and tenure to some extent counterbalanced the impact on 
wage disparities of regional heterogeneity in the return to education. In only one region 
(Cantabria) did the contribution of returns to experience exceed that of education, causing a 
change in the sign of the effect of human capital (from -0.06, corresponding to education, to 
0.03, the total effect of human capital returns). 
 
All in all, the results in this section support our hypothesis regarding the role played by 
differences in endowment and also in returns to human capital to explain regional wage gaps. 
Similarly, within human capital, the crucial elements are the endowment of individuals’ 
education and the return that they obtain from it. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The results of this study confirm the usefulness of using micro-data in studies dealing with 
regional economic disparities and the impact of intangible assets in each region. They provide 
complementary empirical evidence to that obtained from aggregated regional data. In the 
specific case of human capital, the use of individual data allowed us to evaluate both the 
impact of differences in the endowment and the return obtained by individuals within each 
region. 
 
We show that there are significant regional differences in the distribution of education and 
experience in Spain. We also provide evidence of the existence of strong disparities in the 
return to human capital, especially in the case of education. Actually, the results suggest that a 
large proportion of the total effect of education is related to an indirect effect, since the impact 
of education on employability varies considerably from region to region. The detailed 
decomposition of the regional wage gaps has allowed us to demonstrate that regional 
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heterogeneity in the returns to human capital was the main factor explaining wage disparities 
across regions. Moreover, the detailed results suggest that most of this effect should be 
attributed to differences in the return to education, since the differences associated to returns 
to tenure and experience played a minor role in most regions.  
 
An immediate implication can be drawn from these results. It appears that policies aiming to 
promote education are an effective tool in improving workers’ productivity and in lowering 
the risk of unemployment and non-participation in the labour market. The effect of these 
policies is also likely to be stronger in regions with lower levels of development. Therefore, 
raising educational attainment in these regions would contribute to regional convergence in 
labour productivity and unemployment and participation rates. The overall effect would thus 
be an increase in the average income per capita of the less favoured regions and a reduction in 
regional disparities. Also worth noting is the suggestion that the promotion of education in 
less developed regions simultaneously meets the goals of equity and efficiency, given that the 
return of this policy is higher in less developed regions than in more advanced ones. 
 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the conclusions are derived from a partial equilibrium 
exercise. As is usual in exercises of this kind, the counterfactual analysis in this paper did not 
predict the reaction of workers and firms, for instance, to the regional equalization of 
endowments and/or returns to human capital. On the other hand, the system of collective 
bargaining existing in Spain may be inducing wage differences between regions, 
independently of workers’ characteristics; differences in returns may then be related to 
differences in sectoral minimum wages determined at subnational level (Simón et al, 2006). 
Still, our feeling is that the contribution of this element to the estimated regional differentials 
in the return to education is not as important as to invalidate the results discussed above. 
Nonetheless, a deeper analysis of this point is on our future research agenda. 
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APPENDIX 
Evaluating the values of the inverse Mills ratios involved in the RHS of (12) using mean 
characteristics results in: 
 
          MBBAABAABABABBAA Rˆˆ~~ˆ~~ˆˆˆ   (A.1)
 
where  )ˆZ
()ˆZ(~ rrrrr  , r= A, B, and  )ˆZ
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Using a first order Taylor expansion to linearize the terms that involve the inverse Mills 
ratios,  ABAA ~~ˆ   and  BABA ~~ˆ  , around AA ˆZ  and BB ˆZ  respectively: 
 
   
    T2BABBABABA
T1ABAAA
A
BAA
RˆˆZfˆˆˆˆ
RˆZZfˆˆˆˆ


 (A.3)
 
where rr
2
rrrr ˆ)ˆ()(f  , r=A, B, rrr ˆZˆ  , and RT1, RT2 are the residuals of 
approximation. 
 
Using (A.3) and (A.1) the decomposition in (13) can be expressed as: 
 
   
 
   
    T2T1MBBABABBABAB
ABAAAABABA
RRRˆˆˆˆZfˆˆˆX
ˆZZfˆˆXXWW


 (A.4)
 
The expression in (A.4) is then used to obtain the weights for the contribution of each 
characteristic and return as shown in (14). To obtain i ZP  and 
iP  as in (14) it should only be 
noted that AAfˆ  and BAfˆ do not vary across the variables in Z. 
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Table 1. Hourly wages in the Spanish regions. 
   Hourly gross wage  Real Hourly gross wage 
 Obs  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Galicia 795  6.42 3.830  6.51 3.888 
Asturias 396  7.06 4.152  7.00 4.111 
Cantabria 455  6.55 3.963  6.65 4.023 
Basque Country 618  8.75 4.362  8.29 4.134 
Navarre 496  7.91 3.543  7.36 3.296 
La Rioja 358  6.67 2.932  6.57 2.886 
Aragon 576  8.00 4.507  8.29 4.671 
Madrid 1174  8.49 4.800  8.51 4.809 
Castile-Leon 683  7.78 4.659  8.15 4.879 
Castile-La Mancha 613  6.53 3.545  7.06 3.836 
Extremadura 482  6.10 3.496  7.05 4.037 
Catalonia 1513  7.92 4.490  7.44 4.216 
Valencia 886  6.37 2.922  6.46 2.961 
Baleares 379  6.80 3.291  6.50 3.143 
Andalusia 1336  6.60 3.256  6.91 3.409 
Murcia 558  6.23 3.498  6.37 3.580 
Canary Isl. 848  6.49 4.224  6.65 4.327 
Spain 12166  7.19 4.062  7.24 4.063 
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Table 2. Description of the variables in the empirical wage model for Spain and for the 
regions with the highest and lowest wage levels. 
 
  SPAIN MADRID MURCIA 
  Employees Non-
Employees 
Employees Non-
Employees 
Employees Non-
Employees 
 
WORKER’S HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
    
Education (years of schooling) 8.960 4.943 10.931 6.077 7.889 4.820 
  (5.370) (4.195) (5.156) (4.608) (5.516) (4.372) 
 
Experience (years) 
 
18.206 
 
- 
 
18.045 
 
- 
 
17.972 
 
- 
  (12.075) - (11.921) - (12.513) - 
   
 
  
Tenure      
  1 year 29.41% - 24.07% - 29.38% - 
 2-4 years  20.88% - 22.38% - 23.54% - 
 5-9 years 9.53% - 11.23% - 9.56% - 
 10-14 years 10.95% - 10.98% - 11.68% - 
   15 years 28.31% - 30.49% - 24.60% - 
 
INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
    
Age (years) 37.259 44.522 37.383 45.783 36.159 41.855 
 (10.684) (11.876) (10.456) (11.207) (11.342) (12.168) 
 
Household size (persons) 
 
3.697 
 
3.813 
 
3.542 
 
3.676 
 
3.933 
 
4.000 
  (1.276) (1.382) (1.205) (1.168) (1.320) (1.501) 
 
Other household income  
 
1081.951 
 
1465.931 
 
1280.170 
 
1774.817 
 
1024.620 
 
1349.367 
           (€ per month) (972.951) (913.266) (1127.170) (1089.941) (1025.685) (865.200) 
 
Nº children  15 years 
 
0.753 
 
0.928 
 
0.693 
 
0.914 
 
0.922 
 
1.275 
  (0.892) (1.106) (0.881) (1.081) (0.990) (1.380) 
 
Children 0-6 years 
 
24.58% 
 
29.10% 
 
22.80% 
 
27.54% 
 
30.97% 
 
36.24% 
 
Gender 
      
 Male 59.99% 12.54% 53.29% 7.57% 63.72% 12.60% 
 Female 40.01% 87.46% 46.71% 92.43% 36.28% 87.40% 
 
Marital status 
      
 Married 65.65% 84.49% 65.79% 88.12% 66.02% 85.08% 
 Other 34.35% 15.51% 34.21% 11.88% 33.98% 14.92% 
 
Chronic disease 
 
8.75% 
 
25.16% 
 
9.04% 
 
22.72% 
 
10.27% 
 
24.61% 
Note: Sample means and standard deviation in parentheses for the continuous variables. Share of each category 
for the discrete characteristics. 
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Table 3. Wage level within categories of worker human capital endowments. 
 
 SPAIN MADRID MURCIA 
    
Education    
 Illiterate 5.18 5.60 4.49 
 Primary 5.73 6.33 5.11 
 Secondary 6.74 7.46 5.97 
 Tertiary 10.78 11.37 10.53 
    
 
Experience 
   
  1 year 4.70 5.05 3.94 
 2-9 years 5.92 6.80 5.41 
 9-19 years 7.47 8.87 6.75 
 19-29 years 8.12 9.08 6.94 
   30 years 8.06 10.12 7.11 
    
Tenure    
  1 year 5.37 6.04 4.56 
 2-4 years  6.32 7.50 5.70 
 5-9 years 7.28 8.69 5.79 
 10-14 years 8.38 9.78 7.66 
   15 years 9.38 10.67 8.80 
Note: Sample mean of real wage per hour in euros within each category.  
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Table 4. Returns to education in the Spanish regions. 
Region Conditional Return Unconditional Return 
Galicia 
Asturias 
Cantabria 
Basque Country 
Navarre 
La Rioja 
Aragon 
Madrid 
Castile-Leon 
Castile-La Mancha 
Extremadura 
Catalonia 
Valencia 
Baleares 
Andalusia 
Murcia 
Canary Isl. 
0.0895 
0.0625 
0.0968 
0.0596 
0.0716 
0.0552 
0.0664 
0.0491 
0.0774 
0.0721 
0.0713 
0.0536 
0.0501 
0.0662 
0.0603 
0.0795 
0.0680 
0.1903 
0.1823 
0.1674 
0.1585 
0.1240 
0.1312 
0.1940 
0.1625 
0.1848 
0.2022 
0.2450 
0.1253 
0.1604 
0.1732 
0.1943 
0.1665 
0.1590 
Spain 0.0633 0.1679 
Note: All the returns in the table are statistically significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Returns to experience and tenure in the Spanish regions. 
Experience Tenure 
Region 
 2-4 years 5-9 years 10-14 years  15 years
Galicia 0.0163 *** 0.0773 *** 0.0255  0.0227  0.1515 *** 
Asturias 0.0112 *** 0.0629  0.1210 * 0.3785 *** 0.3624 *** 
Cantabria 0.0078 *** -0.0478 * 0.0220  0.0475  0.1636 *** 
Basque Country 0.0098 *** 0.0997 *** 0.1692 *** 0.2994 *** 0.3376 *** 
Navarre 0.0106 *** 0.0989 *** 0.2134 *** 0.1773 *** 0.2757 *** 
La Rioja  0.0085 *** 0.1886 *** 0.1019 ** 0.2692 *** 0.2497 *** 
Aragon 0.0093 *** 0.0955 *** 0.1916 *** 0.2269 *** 0.3758 *** 
Madrid 0.0081 *** 0.1355 *** 0.2428 *** 0.3712 *** 0.4138 *** 
Castile-Leon 0.0133 *** -0.0271  0.1175 *** 0.2717 *** 0.2391 *** 
Castile-La Mancha 0.0091 *** -0.0318  0.1097 *** 0.0833 ** 0.2978 *** 
Extremadura 0.0176 *** 0.0908 ** 0.0569  0.1436 *** 0.1381 *** 
Catalonia 0.0109 *** 0.1250 *** 0.2062 *** 0.2629 *** 0.2818 *** 
Valencia 0.0082 *** 0.0977 *** 0.1093 *** 0.2254 *** 0.3114 *** 
Baleares 0.0068 *** 0.0295  0.0781 * 0.1310 *** 0.1791 *** 
Andalusia 0.0127 *** 0.0912 *** 0.1401 *** 0.2653 *** 0.2298 *** 
Murcia 0.0113 *** 0.1214 *** 0.1301 *** 0.2256 *** 0.2960 *** 
Canary Isl. 0.0115 *** 0.0969 *** 0.1023 *** 0.2544 *** 0.3491 *** 
Spain 0.0108 *** 0.0858 *** 0.1408 *** 0.2328 *** 0.2881 *** 
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Table 6. Regional wage gap decomposition. 
 Wage gap Endowment Returns Residual 
Galicia 0.1201 0.0266 0.1067 -0.0134 
Asturias 0.0415 0.0004 0.1771 -0.1357 
Cantabria 0.0993 -0.0278 0.0598 0.0674 
Basque Country -0.1666 -0.0759 0.0273 -0.1181 
Navarre -0.0517 -0.0363 -0.0032 -0.0122 
La Rioja 0.0541 -0.0259 0.1998 -0.1199 
Aragon -0.1352 -0.0968 0.0385 -0.0765 
Madrid -0.1699 -0.1196 0.0478 -0.0977 
Castile-Leon -0.1055 -0.0657 -0.0665 0.0267 
Castile-La Mancha 0.0259 0.0793 0.0861 -0.1393 
Extremadura 0.0307 0.0436 -0.1837 0.1708 
Catalonia -0.0456 -0.0124 0.0652 -0.0983 
Valencia 0.0896 0.0355 0.0476 0.0062 
Baleares 0.0845 0.0419 0.0559 -0.0137 
Andalusia 0.0342 0.0651 -0.0255 -0.0057 
Murcia 0.1366 0.0606 0.0722 0.0035 
Canary Isl. 0.1146 0.0996 -0.0944 0.1094 
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Table 7. Contribution of human capital and schooling to regional wage gaps 
 
  Human Capital Schooling 
 Wage Gap Endowment Return Endowment Return 
Galicia 0.1201 0.0255 -0.4095 0.0156 -0.2862 
Asturias 0.0415 0.0035 -0.0097 0.0033 -0.0266 
Cantabria 0.0993 -0.0309 0.0346 -0.0178 -0.0602 
Basque Country -0.1666 -0.0764 -0.2421 -0.0631 -0.2624 
Navarre -0.0517 -0.0343 -0.0950 -0.0104 -0.1315 
La Rioja 0.0541 -0.0282 -0.0023 -0.0072 -0.0519 
Aragon -0.1352 -0.1010 -0.2135 -0.0608 -0.2515 
Madrid -0.1699 -0.1293 -0.2305 -0.1193 -0.2805 
Castile-Leon -0.1055 -0.0646 -0.2177 -0.0238 -0.1447 
Castile-La Mancha 0.0259 0.0834 -0.3063 0.0620 -0.2930 
Extremadura 0.0307 0.0462 0.1353 0.0306 0.1825 
Catalonia -0.0456 -0.0104 -0.0888 -0.0012 -0.0608 
Valencia 0.0896 0.0353 0.1223 0.0304 0.0967 
Baleares 0.0845 0.0356 -0.0273 0.0138 -0.0311 
Andalusia 0.0342 0.0701 -0.1156 0.0446 -0.0437 
Murcia 0.1366 0.0683 -0.0907 0.0557 -0.1167 
Canary Isl. 0.1146 0.0954 0.0888 0.0586 0.1020 
 
 
